. Continuous exact non-atomic games are naturally associated to certain operators between Banach spaces. It thus makes sense to study games by means of the corresponding operators. We characterize non-atomic exact market games in terms of the properties of the associated operators. We also prove a separation theorem for weak compact sets of countably additive measures, which is of independent interest.
P
Given a measurable space (Ω, Σ), a TU (tranferable utility) game is a set function ν : Σ → R such that ν (∅) = 0. Ω is the set of players, Σ the σ-algebra of admissible coalitions and ν describes the worth of each coalition. In this paper, we deal with games satisfying a certain number of properties such as continuity, non-atomicity, exactness, etc. We recall the main definitions. A coalition N ∈ Σ is null if ν (A ∪ N ) = ν (A) for all A in Σ; an atom of ν is a non-null coalition A such that for every coalition B ⊂ A either B or A \ B is null. A game ν is non-atomic if it has no atoms ( [5, p. 14] and [12, p. 55] ). Let {A n } be a sequence in Σ, and for each n let A c n denotes the complement of A n . A game ν is continuous if lim n→∞ ν (A n ) = lim n→∞ (ν (Ω) − ν (A c n )) = 0 whenever A n ց ∅. The core of a game ν is the set core(ν) = {µ ∈ ba (Σ) : µ (Ω) = ν (Ω) and µ(A) ≥ ν(A) for all A ∈ Σ}.
where ba(Σ) denotes the Banach space of charges (= finitely additive measures) on Σ endowed with the variation norm. Clearly, the core is always a 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 91A12 JEL classification: C71. Key words and phrases. lower/upper envelopes, separation theorem, exact games, nonatomic market games. I am grateful to Fabio Maccheroni for comments and suggestions. A game ν is the lower envelope of a set K of charges on Σ if it satisfies
for all A ∈ Σ. It is the upper envelope of K if the inf in (1.1) is replaced by a sup. Several classes of games are directly defined as lower/upper envelopes of charges. Examples include the thin games of Amarante and Montrucchio [4] and the symmetric coherent capacities of Kadane and Wasserman [9] . The first obtain when the set K in (1.1) is a thin set of non-atomic (countably additive) measures [4, Definition 5] ; 1 the second when all the charges in K satisfy the following symmetry condition [9, Section 1]: there exists a non-atomic probability measure λ such that
Other classes of games, while defined in a different way, are representable as lower/upper envelopes. This is the case for the class of exact games mentioned above: it is easy to see that a game is exact if and only if it is the lower envelope of a (norm-bounded) subset K of ba α (Σ), where ba α (Σ) = {µ ∈ ba (Σ) : µ (Ω) = α, α ∈ R}. Moreover, several important subclasses of exact games (besides the thin games above) are also lower envelope games. In fact, owing to results of Schmeidler [13] and MarinacciMontrucchio [12, pp. 54-58] , continuous exact games and continuous exact non-atomic games are also lower envelopes games. The former obtain when K is a weak compact subset (in ba α (Σ)) of countably additive measures, while the latter requires that, in addition, all the measures be nonatomic. Finally, by virtue of a result of Amarante-Maccheroni-MarinacciMontrucchio [3, Theorem 3] , the class of exact non-atomic market games is also a class of lower envelope games, which obtains whenever K is a normcompact subset of ba α (Σ).
for all S such that λ (S) > 0 (see [10] ) 2 The definition in [9, Section 1] is slightly different, yet obviously equivalent, to the one given in the text. For lower/upper envelope games, the link between the game and the set of charges defining it is not always sharp. That is, as the next example of Huber and Strassen [8] shows, different sets of charges might define the same game.
Example 1 (Huber and Strassen [8] ). Let Ω = {1, 2, 3} and consider the two measures on Ω defined by µ = ( ). Let ν be the lower envelope game defined by C 1 = co {µ, λ} (where co denotes the convex hull). That is,
for all A ⊂ Ω. It is easy to check that (a)
It is easy to see that the situation described by the example is fairly typical whenever the game has atoms. The next proposition shows, however, that the situation is dramatically different in the non-atomic case. Proposition 1. Let ν : Σ −→ R be a continuous, exact non-atomic game. Then, ν is the lower envelope of a unique, weak compact (in ba(Σ)), convex set of non-atomic measures.
Proof. By the result of Marinacci-Montrucchio mentioned above [12, pp. 54-58] , continuous exact non-atomic games are lower envelopes games defined by a weak-compact set K ⊂ ba α (Σ) consisting of non-atomic measures. By the Bartle-Dunford-Schwartz Theorem (see [6, Cor. 6, p. 14]), the weak compactness of K implies that there exists a non-atomic finite measure λ on Σ such that all the measures in K are absolutely continuous with respect to λ. Thus, by the Radon-Nikodym theorem, K is isometrically isomorphic to a weak compact subset K ′ of L 1 (λ) ([7, Th. IV.9.2]). Since it is continuous, exact and non-atomic, the game ν, however, is also the lower envelope of its core. By Schmeidler's theorem [13] and [7, Th. IV.9 .2], this is also isometrically isomorphic to a weak compact subset K ′′ of L 1 (λ). Clearly, the inclusion K ′ ⊂ K ′′ always holds. We are going to show that necessarly K ′ = K ′′ whenever ν is continuous, exact and non-atomic.
The dual of L 1 (λ) is the Banach space L ∞ (λ) of Σ-measurable, λ-essentially bounded functions on Ω. Let Φ denote the intersection of the positive cone with the unit ball in L ∞ (λ). Since λ is finite and non-atomic, the indicator functions are weak*-dense in Φ (see [10] ). Now, suppose that the exists a κ ∈ K ′′ \K ′ . The sets K ′ and {κ} are both weak compact. Thus, by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem (see [7, Th. V.2.10]) there exists a ϕ 0 ∈ L ∞ (λ) − {0} and a ε > 0 such that
Wlog, we can assume that ϕ 0 ∈ Φ (otherwise take
Consider the functions
where Φ is endowed with the weak*-topology (and is compact in this topology) and K ′ is endowed with the weak-topology (and is compact in this topology). By the continuity of the function F . there exists a weak*-neighborhood of ϕ 0 , W (ϕ 0 ), such that
Since the function G is jointly continuous and K ′ is compact, the Maximum Theorem (see [1, Theorem 17.31]) implies that there exists a weak*-neighborhood of ϕ 0 , U (ϕ 0 ), such that
Since the indicator functions are weak*-dense in Φ, one can take ϕ = χ A , the indicator function of the set A ∈ Σ, and the preceding states that there is a measure µ k ∈ core(ν) such that
which contradicts the fact that ν is the lower envelope of both K and core(ν).
The result of Proposition 1 subsumes earlier results of Amarante-Maccheroni[2], who obtained it for thin cores, and of Amarante-Maccheroni-MarinacciMontrucchio [3] , who obtained it for norm compact cores. With obvious modifications (i.e., by replacing the core with the anti-core), it also applies to symmetric coherent capacities as the symmetry condition of Kadane and Wasserman [9] implies that those cores are weak compact (see [11] ). The same argument as that used in the proof of Proposition 1 leads to the following Corollary, which is of independent interest. 
F
Another property common to both thin games and exact non-atomic market games is that they are both naturally associated with certain compact operators. To see this, let us begin by observing that any continuous exact game is naturally associated with a linear operator L ∞ (λ) → l ∞ (I). For if ν is continuous and exact, then core(ν) is isometrically isomorphic (by Schmeidler's theorem) to a subset F = {f i } i∈I ⊂ L 1 (λ), and we can define the operator T ν :
T ν is the integral of the vector measure µ : Σ −→ l ∞ (I) defined by
We observe that (a) F weakly compact =⇒ µ bounded and countably additive; and (b) the Bartle-Dunford-Schwartz theorem implies that T ν is always weak* to weak continuous (see [6, Corollary 7, p . 14]). Theorem 1. T ν is a compact operator when ν is either an exact non-atomic market game or ν is a thin game.
We are going to show that R is weak* to norm continuous, which immediately implies compactness of T ν . To this end, consider the family of linear functionals F = ·f i dλ | i ∈ I on L ∞ (λ). By considering the restrictions of the functionals to B L ∞ (λ) , we can view F as a subset of C(B L ∞ (λ) ). Since F is norm-compact, it is equicontinuous by Arzelà-Ascoli's theorem. Hence, for any ϕ * ∈ B L ∞ (λ) and ∀ε > 0, there exists a weak* neighborhood U (ϕ * ) such that
which proves that T ν is bounded-weak* to norm continuous.
(2) Let core(ν) ∼ F = {f i } i∈I ⊂ L 1 (λ). If ν is thin, then the normclosure of the range of the vector measure µ is convex [10] . By letting K 0 denote the set of indicator functions in L ∞ (λ), and by
The first equality follows from the fact -noted above -that T ν is always weak* to weak continuous, the second is a definition and the third fol-
is convex, and
-the image of the ball -is norm-compact. Hence, T ν is a compact operator.
A -
Thin games need not be market games as thin sets need not be normcompact (see [4] ). We now give a necessary and sufficient condition for a continuous exact game (hence, a thin game) to be a market game. It is stated in terms of the properties of the operator T ν encountered above.
Theorem 2. A continuous exact game ν is a market game if and only if the associated operator T ν is bounded-weak* to norm continuous.
3
Proof. If ν is a market game, then core(ν) ∼ F = {f i } i∈I ⊂ L 1 (λ) and is compact in the L 1 -norm by [3, Theorem 3] . By the proof of Theorem 1 part (1), T ν is bounded-weak* to norm continuous.
In the converse direction, assume that T ν is bounded-weak* to norm continuous. We are going to show that this implies that the support functional
is continuous for the bounded weak*-topology. In fact, let ϕ * ∈ L ∞ (λ). There exists α ∈ R such that ϕ * ∈ αB L ∞ (λ) . Since T ν | αB L ∞ (λ) is weak*-to-norm continuous, ∀ε > 0 here exists a weak* neighborhood U (ϕ * ) such that we get (by observing that for ϕ ∈ B L ∞ (µ) and f i ∈ L 1 (λ), the mapping w = ( ϕf i dµ) i∈I is a bounded element of R I )
Now, σ F continuous for the bounded weak*-topology implies, by Lemma 3 in [3] , that F is compact in the norm topology. That is, ν is market game. 
